Over on the porch
A question of equal protection
No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice and family. In forming a marital union, two people become something greater than once they were.
The above quote is from the majority opinion of the Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, which just made gay marriage a right to everyone in the USA. This was done with a broad interpretation of the 14th Amendment; you can’t just prevent people who love each other from marrying, after all.
Well, not exactly. Notice the emphasis I placed on the quote. Two people in love have protections under the law that three or more people do not. If:
A. Marriage is just a weird thing people do when they love each other, and
B. It’s wrong to not let people participate in this ritual because of their non-traditional instantiation of the institution
How the fuck is that fair? Why don’t polygamous people deserve equal protection?
Chief Justice Roberts asked this very question:
I do not mean to equate marriage between same-sex couples with plural marriages in all respects. There may well be relevant differences that compel different legal analysis. But if there are, petitioners have not pointed to any. When asked about a plural marital union at oral argument, petitioners asserted that a State “doesn’t have such an institution.” But that is exactly the point: the States at issue here do not have an institution of same-sex marriage, either.
Obviously, the Supreme Court only rules on cases in front of them. It’s just as obvious that if an otherwise identical case about plural marriage reached the SCOTUS, it wouldn’t benefit from the same broad interpretation of the 14th Amendment that just made same-sex marriage legal. They wouldn’t use the logic of “but equal protection. But LOVE!” to protect plural marriage.
This is because fashionable people in urban areas think that same-sex marriage is cool. Fashionable people in urban areas do not think that that polygamy is cool. In fact, it’s downright icky to baby boomers. This preference that the intelligentsia have for gay marriage is obviously the reason that the court made the ruling that it did, and that’s the problem here.
The Supreme Court is only supposed to rule on questions of law, not questions of politics. Theoretically, judges aren’t supposed to have different rulings on otherwise identical issues because all the beautiful people agree that gay marriage is good but plural marriage is still kinda, you know, weird. Even if polygamists people are weirdos, they still fucking get equal protection.
This is the most worrying thing about a very broad interpretation of the law. We already have a legislature and an executive that exist to reflect the current fashions and tastes of the populace. We don’t need a judiciary to reflect the illogical dichotomies of public opinion with illogical interpretations of the law.
*****
Admit It: an 18-year-old shouldn’t be allowed to vote
Reprinted from the Press and Journal
Mark my words: Come January 20th, 2017, Hillary Clinton will be sworn in as the first female president of the United States of America. The media will swoon, the nation will rejoice (at least the half that voted for her), and Chris Matthews will get that old thrill of up leg.
Hillary is, of course, the wife of former President Bill Clinton. She was Secretary of State under President Obama. And she served as a senator during the Bush administration, supporting most of his key initiatives, including the ill-fated Iraq War. With that kind of experience, Hillary will continue many of the same policies, domestic and foreign, that have defined Washington for the past 20 years.
There is something new, however. During her recent campaign kickoff on Roosevelt Island in New York City, Hillary announced that if America sends her back to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, she will implement “universal, automatic” voter registration for any citizen who turns 18-years-old. The crowd went wild over the idea.
At first blush, automatic voter registration doesn’t sound sexy. We live in a democratic republic, so it makes sense that citizens should be able to vote. But why the push for registering all 18-year-old citizens automatically?
Rachel Dolezal is a victim, but not a black one
The tragic murder of nine black Americans in a church in Charleston, South Carolina has taken the wind out of the controversy surrounding the borrowed identity of Rachel Dolezal. The fire isn’t out completely. But national attention is slowly being diverted away from Dolezal, and back to matters of importance.
This is good because the less attention given to Dolezal, the better. Rather than slink away after being exposed as a fraud, the woman who spent decades pretending to be black has gone on national television to defend her charade. She refuses to believe that just because she was born to a white family in Montana, she can’t just up and switch races. Her intransigence speaks to the larger issue of what we mean when we say “race” and what it means to be black in America.
Conservatives have a point in all this hubbub: if race is a pure social construct with no biological foundation, Dolezal should unquestionably be able to claim the mantle of blackness. Anyone who challengers her is a bigot, ignorant of basic social science. Thus, Dolezal might have been born to a white family and grew up white, but can still identify as black without the fear of being unaccepted. That’s the logical conclusion of the “race is not biology” meme.
Gordon Tullock: The Vote Motive
I recently read The Vote Motive, Tullock’s basic introduction to public choice, the field he and James Buchanan helped pioneer as the economic analysis of government. The volume is very slim, yet very insightful. Many of Tullock’s observations challenge deeply held assumptions about the way politics works. Why do people ascribe a different morality to public, as opposed to private actors? Do individual votes “matter” from a results perspective? Why is majority rule so coveted among modern democracies?
I have personally found the questioning of widely believed truths, regardless of the subject matter, to be particularly stimulating and often rewarding as well. Four or five years ago I dropped the view that it was important for a citizen to exercise their right to vote in a society with institutions shaped, at least somewhat, by democracy. I didn’t need a ton of persuading and it was Tullock who did most of the legwork to get me there. The truth was I had never sat down and really thought about why voting was so crucial or attempted to reason my way to a conclusion. It was simply ingrained in societal norms and taught in school starting very early. Woe be unto those who don’t believe voting is all it’s cracked up to be. There is very little room for heretics among the voting fanatics.
Well I can tell you it felt really good to throw off that political dogma and to embrace the fact that your individual vote means almost precisely nothing when it comes to changing political outcomes. The only way your vote “means” anything, the vast vast majority of the time, is to the extent it makes you feel good. That’s it. And so I can’t help but smirk when I see the confused faces of people churning through that startlingly new and scary mental calculus – the same one I churned through a handful of years ago – the first time someone questions what they presumed was a given.
The median reader of this site is perhaps more likely to already doubt or disown the assumptions Tullock attacks in the following quotes, yet I still think they are worth reproducing here.
Excerpts from The Vote Motive.
On politicians’ motives (p. 59):
The analysis of the politician’s tactics indicates simply that he is attempting to be re-elected to office, not that he is attempting to maximise the public interest. We think this situation is realistic, and, in particular, that politicians trying to be re-elected are more likely to be re-elected than those who are not.
There is no reason why we should be disturbed by this phenomenon. The market operates by providing a structure in which individuals who simply want to make money end up producing motor-cars that people want. Similarly, democracy operates so that politicians who simply want to hold public office end up by doing things the people want.
On bureaucracy (p. 61):
Bureaucrats are like other men. This proposition sounds very simple and straightforward, but the consequences are a radical departure from simple orthodox economic theory. If bureaucrats are ordinary men, they will make most of (not all) their decisions in terms of what benefits them, not society as a whole. Like other men, they may occasionally sacrifice their own well-being for the wider good, but we should expect this to be exceptional behaviour.
Most of the existing literature on the machinery of government assumes that, when an activity is delegated to a bureaucrat, he will either carry out the rules and regulations or will make decisions in the public interest regardless of whether it benefits him or not. We do not make this assumption about businessmen. We do not make it about consumers in the market. I see no reason why we should make it about bureaucrats.
On logrolling, or the “the practice of exchanging favors, especially in politics by reciprocal voting for each other’s proposed legislation” (p. 79):
All of this is perfectly normal, not only for British politics but for democratic politics in general. Indeed it is also normal for non-democratic politics, although we know less about them, and hence it is not so clear there. In all democracies that I know of there is both public criticism of logrolling as immoral, as well as the widespread use of it in making government decisions.
and p. 86:
We should not be unhappy about these very common democratic practices, although normal discussion of them is condemnatory. There is no reason why minorities should not be served by democracies.
On majority voting (p. 92):
The total cost inflicted upon society by various rules is calculated by simply summing these two cost lines, as in the total cost line. The low point on this line is the optimal voting rule for the society. Only by coincidence would it be the simple majority. For important matters, I think in general it would be well above the majority and, indeed, most formal constitutions require more than a majority for at least some matters.
Majority voting is thus generally not optimal. For important matters we would require something more. This conclusion is in general accord with constitutional processes throughout the world. But my opinion is that ‘reinforced majorities’, say two-thirds majority, should be used much more widely than they now are. Indeed, I have on occasion recommended that the President of the United States always veto all bills in order to compel a two-thirds vote for everything in both houses of Congress. Startling though this proposal is, the analysis which leads to it is fairly orthodox political economy.
Put Jeannette Rankin on the $10 bill
I’m over at the Guardian arguing just that. Go read!